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Where Are You Hurt?
Kentucky Redefines Workers' Compensation Injury
in a Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder World
JamesM. Inman 1
INTRODUCTION

USTICE Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said, "A page of history is
worth a volume of logic."' This observation might apply to a recent
Kentucky Supreme Court workers' compensation decision. In June 2006,
the Kentucky Supreme Court decided a case that redefined the meaning
of injury under the workers' compensation statute.3 Prior to that decision,
the statutory definition of injury clearly indicated that mental injuries that
are work-related are not compensable unless they are the "direct result of
a physical injury."' 4 RichardE. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White seemingly erased
the statutory requirement that a compensable mental injury be the direct
product of a physical injury.' The decision is based primarily on some
dizzying statutory interpretation 6 and earlier decisions that whittled away at
the statutory requirements. The pre-White cases incrementally disposed of
the statutory language but never fully dispensed with the clear requirement
of a physical injury.7 Justice Holmes's advice seems extremely relevant
to the analysis not simply for its view of precedent but in a general view
that case decisions often make the most sense in historical context. The
White decision should be viewed as the natural result of greater awareness
and acceptance of mental injuries within the general public. The tragedy
of September 11th and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have altered the
perceptions of the public about mental injuries, such as post-traumatic
stress disorder. The Kentucky Supreme Court's decision to eliminate the
i J.D., expected, 2008, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. 2ooo, Centre
College. The author served in Iraq in 2003. The author must thank the Hon. Donald R. Todd
for his assistance with this Note. This Note is dedicated to those in the armed forces who
have witnessed too much in service to their country. The author is grateful for the support,
patience, and love of his wife Elizabeth.
2 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345,349 (1921).
3 See Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White, 202 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2oo6).
4 Id.; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.0011(1) (West 2oo6).
5 White, 202 S.W.3 d at 27.
6 Id. The dissenting opinion in White offers a scathing criticism of the majority's interpretation of the workers' compensation statute. Id. at 28 (Roach, J., dissenting).
7 See Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. West, 52 S.W.3 d 564 (Ky. 2ooi).
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requirement of a physical injury in workers' compensation cases reflects
the sea change of understanding ushered in by the attacks of 9/11 and the
War on Terror.
This Note examines the historical context of White to make sense of
the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision. Part I of this Note centers on the
White decision, its background, and some earlier decisions that played a key
role in the outcome." Part II of this Note focuses on how other jurisdictions
have handled various types of workers' compensation injuries and where
White might fall within established parameters.9 Finally, Part III tries to
explain the court's decision based on the impact that events like September
11th and the War on Terror had on legitimizing mental injuries generally.10
I.

WHITE AND THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING INJURY

In 1996, Kentucky's General Assembly changed the workers' compensation
laws significantly." In his address to the General Assembly opening the First
Extraordinary Session of 1996, Governor Paul Patton called for significant
changes to workers' compensation laws in Kentucky in order to attract
businesses while still protecting the interests of Kentucky's workers.'
Attracting businesses required reducing the costs of administering the
workers' compensation system relative to competing states such as West
Virginia.13 One way of achieving this goal meant reducing litigation and
court costs by shortening the period for resolving cases from "9 to 18
months [under] the present system" to "90 days."' 4 Avoiding protracted
workers' compensation disputes and streamlining the system through
statutorily rigorous standards for determining compensability and amounts
of compensation also served to reduce the costs associated with the prior
system. 5 The statutory rules were designed as a quick reference for
administrative law judges to decide compensability without lengthy court
proceedings. As Governor Patton stated, workers' compensation is not "an
entitlement program for attorneys, or health care providers, or rehabilitation
services companies." 6
Reforming Kentucky's workers' compensation laws focused in part on
eliminating overly litigious areas while retaining strict requirements for
8 See infra notes 1-82 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 83-114 and accompanying text.
io See infra notes 115-69 and accompanying text.
ii

Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.0011; Governor Paul E. Patton, 1996 istExtraordinary Sess.

of the Gen. Assembly, at 3 (Ky. 1996) [hereinafter Patton Speech].
12 Id. at3.
13 Id. at 4.
14 Id. at 5.

15Id. at 3-4.
16 Id. at 3.
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proving "actual physical impairment.., in order to draw compensation."'1 7
With these goals in mind, one area of change for the General Assembly was
the definition of "injury." The revised definition of injury played a critical
role in the Supreme Court's decision in White. The amended definition of
injury under Kentucky Revised Statutes section 342.0011(1) provides:
"Injury" means any work-related traumatic event or series of traumatic
events, including cumulative trauma, arising out of and in the course of
employment which is the proximate cause producinga harmful change in the
human organismevidenced by objective medical findings. "Injury" does not
include the effects of the natural aging process, and does not include any
communicable disease unless the risk of contracting the disease is increased
by the nature of the employment. "Injury" when used generally, unless the
context indicates otherwise, shall include occupational disease and damage
to a prosthetic appliance, but shall not include a psychological,psychiatric, or
stress-relatedchange in the human organism, unless it is a direct result ofa physical
injury.

18

The first sentence of the statute suggests that psychological or mental
injuries incurred while on the job are compensable when they cause a
"harmful change in the human organism."' 9 However, the last sentence
appears to eliminate this possibility. It requires that mental injuries
directly result from physical injury."0 The apparent goal of this change was
to eliminate mental injuries resulting from mental stimuli."1
A. Breakingfrom PlainMeaning:
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. West
Despite an apparently clear definition of when a psychological change
in the human organism is compensable, the Kentucky Supreme Court
interpreted this passage of the statute differently."2 In Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Governmentv. West, the court held that an "event that involves
physical trauma may be viewed as a 'physical injury' without regard
to whether the harmful change that directly and proximately results is
physical, psychological, psychiatric, or stress-related." 3 The court appears
to have taken the first sentence of the statute and reinserted it again in the

17 Id. at 5.
18 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.00 11) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
19 Id.
2o Id.; see 3 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 56.o6[i1(b) (Matthew
Bender 2007).
21 Patton Speech, supra note 1i, at 5.
22 See Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White, 202 S.W.3d 24, 28-31 (Ky. zoo6) (Roach,
J., dissenting).
23 Lexingon-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. West, 5z S.W.3d 564, 566 (Ky. 2001).
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last sentence.14 The last sentence under the court's interpretation might
read: [injury] shall not include psychological, psychiatric, or stress-related
changed . . . unless it is a direct result of a physically traumatic event.2 5

Later decisions explained the court's interpretation of the statute to mean
that harmful mental change must result from physical trauma in order to
be compensable. 6 The glaring problem with this interpretation is that it
ignores the common sense, general definition of trauma completely. The
court has disallowed "injury" as a way to define "physical trauma" and has
2
not fully explained what it means if not "physical injury."
"
Notwithstanding the erosion of the definition of physical injury and
the seemingly circular definition the Kentucky Supreme Court has used
in deciding these cases, the court has been able to distinguish later cases
factually. In West, a police officer applied for workers' compensation after
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder following an incident where
"she was physically assaulted by a knife-wielding suspect."2 8 Westappeared,
in theory, to allow compensation for mental injuries born out of physically
traumatic events but without a physical injury to the claimant. In reality,
the only case to adopt this theory into practice was White. 9 All others since
West and pre-White have featured at least minor physical injuries which
opens the door to compensation of mental injuries.30

24

White,

202

S.W.3d at 30 (Roach, J., dissenting).

25 Id.; West, 52 S.W.3d at 566-67.

26 Kubajak v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, i8o S.W.3d 454 (Ky. 2005); Ryan's
Family Steakhouse v. Thomasson, 82 S.W.3d 889 (Ky. 2002).
27 Borrowing from U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia's analytical toolkit, note that
Webster's Dictionary defines trauma as "[aln injury or wound to a living body caused by the
application of external force or violence... [or] a psychological or emotional stress... that may
produce disordered feelings or behavior." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2432 (Philip B. Gove, ed., 2002). "Trauma" under the Kentucky court's definition becomes

difficult to parse because the General Assembly expressly included the term "physical" before it. Thus, the court seems to have ignored the modifying term "physical" in the statute
and followed a meaning closer to that found in the dictionary.
28 West, 52 S.W.3d at 564-65.
29 Compare White, 202 S.W.3d 24, with Kubajak, I8o S.W.3 d at 459 ("evidence indicat[ed]
that the cause of the claimant's psychiatric harm was an after-the-fact exposure to scenes of
physical trauma to others..." and not the same type of "physical encounter with a suspect"
that occurred in West), with Ryan's Family Steakhouse, 82 S.W.3d at 893 (The Supreme Court of
Kentucky reiterated that a mental injury must result from a physically traumatic event and
that physical exertion at work could constitute a physically traumatic event).
30 See Kubajak, 18o S.W.3 d at 455 (Claim was denied because claimant police officer
failed to produce objective medical evidence that his post-traumatic stress disorder resulted
from a physically traumatic event. Claimant's disorder was found to be related to observation
of "gruesome crime scenes"); West, 52 S.W.3d at 565 ("scratches, abrasions, and soreness ...
[were] severe enough to comply with the term 'physical injury"'). Cf. McCowan v. Matsushita
Appliance Co., 95 S.W.3d 30, 32-33 (Ky. 2ooz) (mentally traumatic events that directly result
in a physical injury are compensable under Kentucky's Workers' Compensation Act).
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B. Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White:
Erodingthe Requirement of a PhysicalInjury
The White decision truly represented a change in workers' compensation
law in Kentucky. The Supreme Court of Kentucky effectively overlooked
both the plain statutory requirement that mental injuries directly result
from a physical injury and the case law that had developed in the wake of
West.3 White expanded the nebulous definition of "physically traumatic"
event that was adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court in West.
Chris White served as a Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government
police officer.3" In his time off, Detective White worked as a security guard
at a shopping mall in Lexington, Kentucky.33 As part of his regular police
duties, Detective White was required to carry a firearm in order to respond
to emergency situations.m On the evening of January 5, 2001, Detective
White was working at the shopping mall in plainclothes.3" He received
notice that a man "dressed in a security guard uniform, armed with a night
stick, and threatening suicide" was somewhere on the premises. 36 Once
Detective White finally located the man in the parking lot, the suspect
produced a gun.37 Detective White drew his own weapon and identified
himself to the man as a police officer.38 Nevertheless, the man aimed his
weapon at Detective White. Detective White then shot the man several
times in the chest.39 He continued to advance against Detective White

31 See Lexingon-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. West, 52 S.W.3 d 564 (Ky. 2001); Ky. REV.
§ 342.0011 (1) (West 2OO6).
32 Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v.White, 202 S.W.3d 24, 25 (Ky. 2oo6).
33 Id. Kentucky Revised Statutes § 95.015 authorizes police officers to "exercislel their
rights and privileges [in] entering into any endeavor enjoyed by all other citizens of the city in
which they reside" provided they "abide by and adhere to the rules, regulations and laws set
forth by the Kentucky Revised Statutes, and the legislative body of the city in which they are
employed." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 95.015 (West zoo6). Officer White had approval from the
LFUCG police department to work at the mall. See also LFUCG Division of Police General
Order 73-15/G, Dec. 12, 1994 (Off-Duty Employment) ("[Off-duty employment in general
... may prove mutually beneficial to the officer and the private sector ....
).
34 White, 202 S.W.3d at 25. See also LFUCG Division of Police General Order 73-15/G
(Dec. 12, 1994) (Off-Duty Employment) ("a police officer's primary duty ... must remain
with the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Division of Police"); White v. Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Gov't, WC Claim No. 03-00075, Ky. Office of Workers' Claims, at 3 (Jan. 29,
2004) (A.L.J. opinion and order) ("Major Bosse [testified] that off-duty police officers are
required to have their sidearms accessible and to respond to high priority situations 24 hours
per day") [hereinafter A.L.J. Opinion].
35 White, 202 S.W.3d at 25.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. For a fuller description of the events see A.L.J. Opinion, supra note 34, at 2-5.
39 White, 202 S.W.3d at 25.
STAT. ANN.
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despite being shot in the chest. 40 Detective White continued firing until4
the man fell. 41 He then tried to keep the man alive by performing CPR. 1
After those efforts failed, Detective White was "directed not to clean the
blood off his extremities" until investigators could examine him. 43 He
was not permitted to clean himself for "many hours." 44 The only physical
contact between Detective White and the man was during Detective
White's first-aid efforts.45 Since the suspect's blood was not tested for
any diseases, Detective White was required to undergo regular testing to
determine whether he had contracted any blood-borne contagion from the
suspect.'
After the incident, Detective White suffered from a number of mental
ailments. He experienced severe anxiety and worry over whether the
internal investigation into the shooting would prevent him from returning
to work. 47 He also worried that the prolonged contact with the assailant's
blood and body fluids might have infected him with "a disease such as
AIDS or tuberculosis. 4
After returning to work three months later,
Detective White continued to suffer from nightmares, paranoia, and
flashbacks related to the incident. 49 He was treated by a psychologist and
"subsequently applied for and received disability retirement. 50° Detective
White did not sustain any physical injury;5 in fact, the Assaulted Officer
Report filed at the time of the incident did not "reflect any physical trauma
or harm."5"
Detective White applied for workers' compensation benefits for the
post-traumatic stress disorder that resulted from the incident.53 Five
psychiatrists diagnosed Detective White with chronic post-traumatic stress

40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Brief of Petitioner at 2, White v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, WC Claim
No. 03-00075 (Ky. Workers' Comp. Bd. Mar 25, 2004) [hereinafter Petitioner's Briefi.
44 Id. at 3.
45 White, 202 S.W.3d at 26. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 43, at 2 (Detective White
"plac[ed] his fingers inside the bullets holes in an attempt to stop the bleeding .... [White]
was sure that he had been shot ... because there was blood and mucous all over his face").
46 White v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, WC Claim No. 03-00075, Ky.
Workers' Comp. Bd. at 2 (June 23, 2004) [hereinafter Board Opinion].
47 Id. at 6.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 A.L.J. Opinion, supra note 34, at 5.
51 Id.
52 Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White, 2oz S.W.3d 24, z6 (Ky. 2006).
53 Id. at 25.
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disorder stemming from the incident at the mall. 4 All agreed that he could
not return to police work."5
Procedurally, the various opinions at each stage of Detective White's
claim for compensation revealed the same issues that exist in reconciling
the statutory definition of injury and the Westdefinition. The Administrative
Law Judge (A.L.J.) that first heard Detective White's case dismissed his
claim.1 6 While conceding that White suffered from post-traumatic stress
disorder,5 7 the A.L.J. denied compensation for his post-traumatic stress
disorder under Kentucky's statute because he failed to adduce "lay or
medical evidence of any physical assault or even a minor physical injury."5 8
Furthermore, the A.L.J. believed that the West case was "inapposite to
[White's] situation" and found that the lack of even minor physical injuries
failed to "bring the resultant psychiatric condition within the statutory
59
definition.
On White's appeal, the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the
A.L.J.'s opinion.' The Board's opinion largely transcribed the opinion of
the A.L.J. below, 61 but the opinion features a strong call for change either
from the courts or the General Assembly. 6 The Board's opinion stated "the
distinction between direct exposure to possibly tainted blood as opposed
to minor scrapes and abrasions appears Draconian ...[and u]ntil precedent
exists that a mere touching may, under certain circumstances, constitute a
physically traumatic event, a psychological claim such as White's cannot
prevail."'63
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, relying heavily on West, reversed the
decision of the Board" and remanded the case after holding that White's
incident "most assuredly involved physical trauma. ' 6 The court noted
that Detective White "endured the physical impact of being coated with
bodily fluids with a threat of much more serious health consequences
than scratches and abrasions." 66 The reasoning utilized amounted to

54
55
56
57
58
59

A.L.J. Opinion, supra note 34, at 6-8.
Id.
Id. at Ii.
Id. at io.
Id. at io.
Id. at 9.
60 Board Opinion, supra note 46, at 15.
6i Seeid. at z-ii.
62 Id. at 15.

63 Id. at

15.

64 See White v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, No. zoo 4 -CA-ooI457-WC,
2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 127, at * I (Ky. Ct. App. May 27, 2005); Bruce Shreiner, Ex-OfficerRuled
Eligible in Workers' Comp Case, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), May z8, 2005, at B3.
65 White, 2005 Ky.App. LEXIS 127, at *I,*io.
66 Id. at *II.
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a comparison of the relative harms that the claimants in West and White
endured. No clear definition of injury emerged from the opinion. The
main opinion defined physical trauma in White as a "seriously intimate
physical encounter with a criminal suspect. ' 67 A concurring opinion from
the Court of Appeals defined physical injury as "physical confrontation" to
seemingly avoid the appearance of compensating White's post-traumatic
stress disorder on the basis of a "mere touching."' The dissenting opinion
offered yet another definition. The dissent accused the Court of Appeals
of allowing compensation based on a definition of physical injury equal to
69
a "life-threatening situation.
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision
but for different reasons.70 In contrast to the Court of Appeals decision that
"contact with another's blood and body fluids during a lifesaving attempt
constituted physical trauma," the Supreme Court held that the "physical
exertion of performing CPR and first aid on an individual with multiple
gunshot wounds is a physically traumatic event."71 Relying on West and
another post-West decision,7" the court explained that a "physical trauma
need not involve an impact from an outside force; it may involve physical
exertion." 73 The court thus expanded the definition of injury, based in part
on the faulty reasoning of West. Under the court's decision in White, physical
exertion can be substituted for an "impact from an outside force."74 But
even the West decision required that physical exertion lead to physical
trauma before mental injuries are compensable.75 The court has left us with
another circular definition. Under West, the court ignored the plain reading
of the statute that required a physical injury and said that physical trauma
is acceptable as a source of directly resulting mental injuries. However,
67 Id. at *io-ii.
68 Id. at * 11 (Combs, J., concurring).
69 Id. at *I2-13 (Minton, J., dissenting).
70 See Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White, 202 S.W.3d 24, 25 (Ky. zoo6).
71 Id. See also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.0011 (1) (West 2oo6) ('"Injury' does not include
..any communicable disease unless the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
nature of the employment").
72 The court uses Ryan's Family Steakhousev. Thomasson, 82 S.W.3d 889,893 (Ky. 2002), as
support for its reasoning. In that case a restaurant worker experienced severe neck pain after
exerting herself to clean an elevated shelf at work. The claimant in that case did not claim any
mental injury. The court noted that the 1996 changes by the General Assembly to "injury"
were intended to "limit compensation for psychological, psychiatric, and stress-related claims
more effectively." Id. at 893. Also, the court reasoned the legislature was targeting mental
injuries only by changing the definition from injury to trauma. Id. The court's decision to use
this case as support is curious. Why use a case that limits compensation for mental injuries in
support of a decision that expands compensation?
73 White, 202 S.W.3 d at 27.
74 Id.
75 See Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. West, 52 S.W.3d 564, 566-67
(Ky. 2002).
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trauma, in the general common usage of the word, means injury.76 What
is left is a phrase-"physically traumatic event" -without meaning after
the White decision. White ignored the problems of West and further pushed
the boundaries of what physical trauma is compensable. In contrast to the
claimant in West and others since, Detective White experienced no physical
injury. Including physical exertion in the class of physically traumatic
events only dilutes that requirement further than West. The White decision
might allow a worker executing their daily duties to be compensated for
mental injuries resulting from exertion. Exertion cannot be viewed as the
same quantum as injury, which is what the statute requires. Ignoring the
language of the statute undermines the General Assembly's 1996 attempt
to limit compensation for mental injuries.7 7 It is not clear from White if
other incidents such as physical situations, 78 physical confrontations,7 9
or touching80 would make resulting mental injuries compensable. The
court's physically traumatic event definition is expanding and based on
problematic reasoning."
One important observation from White and its procedural history relates
to the "Draconian distinction" pointed out by the Workers' Compensation
Board. As this Note suggests, the problem lies with denying compensation
for these mental injuries in the first place. Relying on a bright line rule
authorizing compensation based on minor scrapes and abrasions but not
severely traumatic exposure, touching, or events that might be more
worthy of compensation is also problematic. 8 Kentucky is not alone in
this struggle. In fact, other states have wrestled with which work-related
mental injuries are compensable. The next part outlines the various types
of workers' compensation injuries and where Kentucky's system fits. This
examination is useful in determining how to clarify "physical trauma"
and outline a course for changes to the Kentucky workers' compensation
statute.
II.

DECIPHERING WHITE IN COMPARISON

TO OTHER WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEMS

The key problem with White is its inconsistency with the statutory
definition of injury. Defining injury is crucial to any workers' compensation
system because it has an immediate effect on costs to businesses and the
76 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
77 See Patton Speech, supra note i i.
78 White v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, No. 2oo4-CA-oo1457-WC, 2005
Ky. App. LEXIS 127, at *12 (Ky. Ct. App. May 27, zoo5) (Minton, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at *i i (Combs, J., concurring).
8o Id. at *13 (Minton, J., dissenting).
8I Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White, 202 S.W. 3 d 24, 28-31 (Roach, J., dissenting).
8z Board Opinion, supranote 46, at 15.
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protection of workforce employees. The criticism of White is not a judgment
on compensation for mental injuries. In fact, many states have dealt with
work-related mental injuries differently and allow compensation for none,
some, or all of these types of injuries.83 It is helpful to understand other
approaches in order to develop solutions to Kentucky's issue. Perhaps
other approaches offer a more satisfying basis for avoiding compensation
of mental injuries.
Examining workers' compensation statutes is an exercise in semantics.
Words such as "injury," "harm," "trauma," and "stimulus" take on myriad
meanings across state borders. The first step to understanding a workers'
compensation statute is to understand the meaning of these critical terms.
For example, a change in the definition of injury can dramatically alter the
number of compensable claims within a workers' compensation system.
Another important part of workers' compensation is the distinction
between deciding if there is in fact an injury-mental, physical, or bothand determining whether that injury is compensable. Making a factual
determination involves deciding if an injury is legitimate based on medical
evaluations of a worker.84 Deciding what injuries are compensable is a
legal determination and is a function of how inclusive a state wants its
workers' compensation to be, but the forms of injuries fall generally into
three categories when mental injuries are involved. First, physical-mental
injuries are widely recognized.85 Physical-mental injuries result when a
physical stimulus or trauma directly results in, or causes, a mental injury. 86
Second, mental-physical injuries involve a mental stimulus that provokes
a physical injury. 87 The prototypical example would be one where a worker
perhaps experiences severe mental anguish or stress that induces a heart
attack, aneurysm, or other physical injury.8" Finally, there are mentalmental cases where a mental stimulus causes a mental or nervous injury,
such as post-traumatic stress disorder.89
83 See infra notes 95-109 and accompanying text.
84 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.0011 (1) (West 2oo6) ("evidenced by objective medical
findings"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44o.o9(i) (West 2006) ("'objective relevant medical findings'
are those objective findings that... are confirmed by physical examination findings"); W. VA.
CODE, § 23-4-8 (West 2oo6) ("The commission [may] ... order a claimant of compensation
for a personal injury ... to appear for examination before a medical examiner").
85 3-56 LARsON, supra note 20, § 56.03. See also NORMAN E. HARNED, KENTUCKY WORKERS'
COMPENSATION § 13.01 (3d ed. zoo6).
86 Id.
87 See LARSON, supra note 20, § 56.o2. Kentucky's Supreme Court held mental-physical
claims valid in McCowan v. MatsushitaAppliance Co., 95 S.W.3 d 30,32-33 (Ky. 2oo2). See supra
note 30; see also HARNE, supranote 85, § 13.05.
88 LARSON, supranote 20, § 56.02[2].
89 See LARSON, supra note 20, § 56.04. See also HARNED, supra note 85, § 13.o6. But cf.
Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White, 202 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2oo6) (The White case is too recent
a decision for this edition of HARNED'S KENTUCKY'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION).
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The mental-mental categorycan be further subdivided based on whether
states compensate for mental-mental injuries. After White, Kentucky
moved out of the physical-mental category, but the amorphous definition
of "physically traumatic" makes categorizing Kentucky's position difficult.
White falls within the mental-mental category based on the fact that White
experienced no physical injury. The first subcategory includes states that
never allow compensation for mental-mental injuries of any kind.,, The
next subcategory allows compensation for work-related mental-mental
injuries when they are caused by gradual or sudden stimuli. 91 The third
subcategory additionally requires that a stimulus be unusual. 9 Last is the
subcategory that allows compensation when they are caused by a sudden
stimulus and are not the product of a "series of stressful incidents." 93
Kentucky's workers' compensation statute appears to fit in the
subcategory that never allows compensation for mental-mental injuries.'
However, as noted above, Whitechanged the statutory definition and allowed
compensation for mental-mental injuries. In comparison, Florida's statute
regarding injury does not explicitly require a physical injury in order for a
mental injury to be compensable. 9 Ironically, Florida's Supreme Court has
interpreted the statutory definition of "accident" to deny compensation for
mental-mental claims.' Kentucky has moved in the opposite direction,
expanding a statutory definition to allow mental-mental claims.
In the next grouping are states that allow mental-mental compensation
whether they are the result of gradual or sudden stimuli. 97 Virginia takes
an interesting approach to mental-mental cases that is a promising way
of dealing with these types of injuries. For example, post-traumatic
stress disorder "may be compensable as an injury by accident" or as an
"occupational disease."9 The critical distinction between Virginia's system
and Kentucky's is the wording of the pertinent statutory definition. As in
Kentucky, Virginia's code includes occupational disease in the definition
of injury,99 but Kentucky's statute still requires that both occupational
diseases (in this case, a disease of the mind) and mental injuries be the

See LARSON, supra note 20, § 56.06[4].
91 See id. § 56.0615].
90
92

See id. § 56.o6[6].

93
94
95
96
97
98

See id. § 56.06[7].
See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §

(West 2006).
zoo6).
City of Holmes Beach v. Grace, 598 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1992).
LeARsoN, supra note zo, § 56.06[7].
Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Dep't v. Mottram, 559 S.E.2d 698, 703-04 (Va.
342.0011(l)

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02( i) (West

2002).

99 VA. CODE ANN.
(West zoo6).

§ 65.2-1oi,

65.2-400 (West 2006). See also N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 34:15-31

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96

result of a physical trauma. 10° Perhaps Kentucky's Supreme Court could
utilize a less strained interpretation of the statute by relying on the
two-pronged approach to mental-mental claims from Virginia, allowing
compensation under the occupational disease portions of the statute when
the circumstances dictate.'
In some jurisdictions, compensation for mental-mental injuries depends
on the nature of the stimulus involved.'
Some of these states require an
unusual stimulus to allow compensation. Within this group, some states
require a comparison of the effect of the stimulant on the claimant versus
its effect on the general public to determine if it is unusual. 03 Other states
require a comparison between its effect on the claimant and the claimant's
coworkers-is the stimulus greater for the claimant than her coworkers?" °4
For example, a teacher might claim compensation for mental injuries that
result from chronic stress in daily teaching duties such as disciplining unruly
students. 05 In a jurisdiction requiring an unusual stimulus, compensation
for resulting mental injuries depends on whether the stress is greater
than other teachers experience or greater than what the general public
experiences. In Kentucky, both the White and West decisions intimate that
one factor in deciding compensability is the unusual nature of the stimulus,
but neither decision expressly adopts this requirement.' °6 Certainly, a
requirement that a stimulus be unusual limits compensation more greatly
than allowing a gradual or sudden stimulus alone. Limiting compensation
based on how unusual the stimulus is would satisfy the legislative intent
behind Kentucky's 1996 workers' compensation changes.
Finally, some states require that a stimulus be sudden for mentalmental claims to be compensable. 07 An example would be a worker who
develops mental injuries such as depression, anxiety, or excessive worrying
related to a gradual stimulus at work. 08 Jurisdictions within this group
disallow compensation for gradual stimuli because it is easier to establish
ioo Ky.

REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.0011 () (West

zoo6).

ioi Interestingly, West Virginia's legislature amended their workers' compensation statute to expressly supersede Breeden v. Workmen ' CompensationCommissioner, 285 S.E.2d 398 (W.
Va. 1981), which had authorized compensation for mental-mental injuries or disease. SeeW.
VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-If (West 2oo6).
102 LARSON,

supranote

20,

§ 56.o6[6].

103 See id.
104 Id.
io5 See also Baggett v. Indus. Comm'n, 775 N.E.2d 908, 914-15 (I11.200z); Spencer v.
Time Warner Cable, 717 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
io6 See Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White, 202 S.W.3d 24, 25 (Ky. 2oo6) (Police officer feared he contracted a communicable disease after contact with an injured person's blood);
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. West, 52 S.W.3d 564 (Ky. 2ooi).
107 LARSON, supra note 20, § 56.06[5].
io8 See Goodloe v. Tennessee, 36 S.W.3d 62,67 (Tenn. 200 i) (compensation denied where
employee's depression gradually worsened due to poor work relationship with superiors).
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causation for a mental injury when there is a requirement for a sudden or
unexpected work-related stimulus.' 9 Kentucky's workers' compensation
statute might fit within this category. Unfortunately, West eliminated this
possibility because that decision clearly allowed compensation for a mental
injury based on the cumulative effect of trauma after the West claimant's
initial physical encounter." 0 Additionally, Kentucky's statute expressly
includes "cumulative trauma" in the definition of injury."' White makes
no mention of a requirement that a mental-mental injury be the result of
a sudden stimulus, although the claimant in White experienced a sudden,
2
well-defined stimulus."
Kentucky's compensation for mental-mental injuries after White
appears to fit the "unusual" subcategory best. However, the White opinion
described the injury Detective White felt as a physical trauma leading
to post-traumatic stress disorder. As noted above, the substance of the
decision in White allows mental-mental compensation despite its form." 3
An argument could be made that White places Kentucky in the category
compensating mental-mental injuries when the stimulus is gradual or
sudden. However, any decision from the court that tries to firmly place
White in the physical-mental category will require a firmer definition of
"physically traumatic event." If later decision's concede that Kentucky's
courts have authorized compensation for mental-mental injuries, as White
suggests, then more guidance is needed to determine the criteria for what
types of stimuli are compensable.
Regardless of where Kentucky's changes fall, it is interesting to note
the varied approaches to compensation for mental-mental injuries. Every
jurisdiction has an opinion. As noted above, the issue generally is not
whether a claimant has suffered mental injuries such as post-traumatic stress
disorder. The issue is usually a matter of cost-whether to compensate
workers for these injuries and thus increase the costs to employers." 4 The
problem with a cost approach to workers' compensation is the somewhat
arbitrary distinction between injuries where one claimant's physical
condition is less disabling than another's mental condition but the latter's
claim is not compensable. There is growing consideration for mental
injuries, whatever the level of compensation.

1o9 See McCallum v. Dana's Housekeeping, 940 P.zd 1022, 1024 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996)

(The statutory provision requiring sudden stimulus in mental-mental claims "was enacted
to prevent frivolous and unnecessary claims by providing an objective basis for the proof of
stress-related claims which arise independent of a physical injury").
1 lo See Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. West, 52 S.W3d 564 (Ky.
2002).
iii

Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.001I(1) (West

zoo6).

112 See Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White, 202 S.W.3d 24, 25 (Ky. 2006).
113 Seesupra notes 31-82 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes I 1-17, 21 and accompanying text.
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III. LEGITIMIZING MENTAL-MENTAL CLAIMS POST-9/I I

Although the Kentucky Supreme Court's reasoning in White may be flawed
and determining the exact parameters of "physically traumatic event" is
difficult, the decision reflects a growing appreciation within the general
public and the medical community of the seriousness of mental-mental
injuries. Events from 2001-2007 have played a key role in this shift. The
terrorist attacks on September l1th and the War on Terror have raised
awareness of nervous injuries resulting from mental stimuli. Subsequent
studies have lent scientific credibility to claims for compensation more
than in any other historical period."' These events provided a unique
opportunity for scientists to study the effects mental stimuli have on mental
injuries in the general public, "first responders," and combat veterans, thus
legitimizing mental-mental claims in the process. White represents a shift
in Kentucky that reflects the reality that mental-mental injuries can be as
debilitating as purely physical work-related injuries.
Historically, comprehensive studies and understanding of mental
injuries such as post-traumatic stress disorder were limited. Not
surprisingly, willingness to compensate workers for these types of injuries
was also limited. Only as new studies about conditions like post-traumatic
stress disorder have been conducted has understanding increased. Posttraumatic stress disorder was commonly known as "shell shock" or "combat
fatigue."'1 6 It was thought to only afflict combat veterans, but psychologists
have applied it increasingly to others as well. Initially, this meant studying
people who experienced some trauma directly or had a close relative
or friend directly affected. 17 Studies of post-traumatic stress disorder
8
typically followed combat veterans."
September 11 th provided an opportunity for greater study of the general
public than ever before. The World Trade Center attack is often compared
to the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, but they differed in that major
psychological studies were conducted immediately after 9/11 to gauge the
effect of mass trauma on the population of New York City and the rest of
the country.'19 The Iraq War has also provided a fertile environment for the
study of post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental injuries. Studies

115 See 9/11: MENTAL HEALTH IN THE WAKE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS (Yuval Neria et al. eds.,
2006); PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR (Bruce Bongar, et. al. eds., 2007).
116 Felicia R. Lee, Is Trauma Being Trivialized?,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2003, at B9.
117 See 9/l1: MENTAL HEALTH IN THE WAKE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS, supra note 115;
PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR, supra note 115.
118 Erica Goode and Emily Eakin, Threats and Responses: The Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
1[,2002, atA2.
119 9/11: MENTAL HEALTH IN THE WAKE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS, supra note 115, at 592594; PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR, supra note 115, at 8I; see also Goode and Eakin, supra note 118,
at A2.
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of Iraq War veterans have added to prior studies of Vietnam veterans. 2 0
Undoubtedly, 9/11 has changed the way mental-mental type injuries are
viewed. Studies of combat veterans and the military's methods for dealing
with mental-mental injuries implicate changing attitudes towards these
types of injuries and offer solutions for the general public's treatment of
workers' compensation injuries.'
The terrorist attacks on September 11 th initially sparked concern that
not enough psychiatric assistance would be available to treat large-scale
mental injuries in the general public.' One benefit of the enormous influx
of medical professionals was the ability to at least partly document the
reaction to such a tragic and traumatic event. 2 3 The first studies about the
mental effects of 9/11 have been completed. They alter the way in which
post-traumatic stress disorder, in particular, and other mental ailments
are viewed medically.1 14 It was assumed that "the highest prevalence of
[post-traumatic stress] would be in the [New York City] borough where the
[World Trade Center] was located."'2 5 In fact, many people experienced
"mental disorder ... who were very far from the buildings" and some were
affected across the country.2 6 Essentially, there are those who experienced
clear physical-mental injuries, but for many the indirect stimulus of
witnessing the events of 9/11 from afar caused serious mental-mental type
injuries as well. The post-9/11 studies suggest that existing definitions
of when a person can be affected injuriously by a mental stimulus need
revision. Concededly, there are no perfect criteria for determining who will
be affected by a traumatic event.2 7 What these studies have demonstrated
i20 See Felicia R. Lee, Is Trauma Being Trivialized?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2003, at B9
("[Post-traumatic stress disorder] was first diagnosed by the American Psychiatric Association
in 198o after trauma symptoms were seen in returning Vietnam War veterans").
121 See infra notes 15o-169 and accompanying text.
122 Goode and Eakin, supra note I18,at A2.
123

See id.

Medical definitions of post-traumatic stress disorder have typically required that the
victim directly observe a traumatic event. However, studies after 9/Il have shown that because the incidence of post-traumatic stress disorder is so high in relation to the portion of the
general population meeting the directly-witnessing criteria, there is need for a revision of this
definition to account for the indirect effects of such stimuli. See 9/Il: MENTAL HEALTH IN THE
WAKE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS,supra note 115, at 36.
124

125

Id.at 35.

Id. at 17. In one New York Times article, a doctor offered the following: "If you lived
across from the World Trade Center, you were obviously directly affected. What's less obvious is that if you were sitting in Des Moines and your granddaughter just started working in
the World Trade Center, that's a pretty direct exposure." Goode and Eakin, supra note 1I8,
at A2.
127 Researchers have been unable to identify "who would fall ill, although they could
name some factors-proximity, a history of trauma, a feeling of unreality ... that seemed
to make people more vulnerable." Goode and Eakin, supra note I18, at AZ. See also 9/11:
MENTAL HEALTH IN THE WAKE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS,supra note I15, at 64-65.
126
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is that the current definitions and parameters no longer accurately describe
the psychological impact of a traumatic event.
A particular problem in conducting studies after 9/11 was dealing with
"first responders," such as police and firefighters. Their job was to respond
to the attacks and many were undoubtedly affected directly by the events
of that day. Yet studies conducted after 9/11 offer conflicting assessments
of the impact of mental trauma on these individuals.' One study suggests
that "first responders"'. "experiences, afford them the emotional skills
required to function in dangerous and tragic environments." ' 9 Another
points to the high incidence of mental disorders in "first responders"
following 9/11 and the fact that many suffering from disorders would not
seek medical treatment because of the perceived stigma. 3 ' Still, these
studies focus on the mental stimulus that confronted "first responders."
Certainly many were physically injured but a great number were only
influenced by what they experienced and witnessed. The studies suggest
that the stimulus need not originate from a physical injury in order to result
in mental disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder.'3 ' The mental
trauma of the day caused significant mental injuries without the aid of
physical trauma or injuries. An important question for Kentucky would
be how many "first responders" would be disabled by mental injuries had
those events occurred in Kentucky and how many would be compensated
for their diminished capacity to work.
As those directly affected by 9/11 and the general public dealt with the
tragedy of that day, later events provided constant stress that exacerbated
the effect of mental injuries from 9/11 and raised consciousness of mentalmental injuries.'32 The anthrax scare in 2001 contributed to a general sense
of fear within the United States.13 3 The American public had to cope with
the threat of a deadly biological attack, launched from an unknown source
and delivered to their home with the electric bill. The military invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq brought deep concerns within the public of a large1 34
scale retaliation in the form of a future indeterminate terrorist attack.
The government implemented a threat level system to help predict
128

See generally 9/1 1: MENTAL

HEALTH IN THE WAKE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS,

supra note

115; PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR, supra note 115.
129 PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR, supra note 115, at 420.
130 9/I I: MENTAL HEALTH IN THE WAKE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS,

supra note 115, at 350.

131 Id. at 334-35.
132 See id. at 64-65 ("Our results over the first i8 months after the attacks suggest the
importance of prior mental health history, prior life traumas, as well as the significant role
of subsequent stressors, in explaining the distress and symptomatology over time. In addition, our findings from the Iraq war survey suggests that stress symptoms in response to one
event-in this case, the Iraq war-may be strongly related to responses to a prior event-the
September I ith attacks").
133 Id.at 592.
134 Id. at 592-93.
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when a terrorist attack might occur, but the system created confusion
and stress because an attack always seemed imminent. 3 Unfortunately,
' 13 6
"[m]ismanaged alarm procedures do the terrorists' work for them."
For the most part, only a portion of the population was affected directly
by these events, but the public in general reacted to the mood of feara mental stimulus-by avoiding air travel, preparing wills, and buying
guns.' 37 Perhaps a more subtle result of these "constant stressors" was to
raise the general consciousness about the effects of these mental stimuli on
the public psyche and mental health.'38 Of course, this is part of the goal
of terrorism. "[Tihe strategic intent of modern terrorists is to create huge
numbers of secondary psychological casualties by means of large-scale
physical attacks ...[T]errorists want a lot of people dead-and even more
139
people crippled by fear and grief."'
The media plays a crucial role in this mental-mental equation, as it
can provide the conduit through which the mental stimulus of traumatic
events, such as 9/11, cause mental injuries in the public located many miles
away. 4 ° "[Media] must report terrorist attacks as they happen .. .[and]
they are part of the reason these incidents occur in the first place."'' As
previously discussed, acts of terrorism are most effective when witnessed
by more people. 14 The terrorist benefits from having television coverage
of their misdeeds because their damaging effects reach a wider audience.
Viewers watched the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and
the hijacked plane crash in Pennsylvania, live from locations all over the
country. 4 3 The simple fact that the attack took place in New York City
and not a more media-remote location amplified the terrorists' message."
Moreover, replays of the events of 9/11 and the non-stop coverage
immediately following reinforced the terrorist's message and undoubtedly
135 PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR, supra note 115, at 359. "In an investigative report dated
October 12, 2005, MSNBC commentator Keith Olberman analyzed the [then-]recent threats
against the New York City subway system in light of previous terror alerts. He documented
13 cases between May 2002 and October 2005 in which a significant political downturn by the
Bush administration was immediately followed by a terror warning within a matter of days."
Id. at 368.
136 Id. at 361.
137

138
139
140
141

Id.at

23.

See 91 I: MENTAL HEALTH IN THE WAKE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS, supra note 115.
PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR, supra note 115, at 5.
Seeid. at 81-86.
Id. at 81.
142 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
143 PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR, supra note 115, at 8i. Other events including the anthrax
scare in 2001 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided more opportunities for media to serve as a conduit for terrorist acts. Id. at 84. See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying
text.
144 PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR, supra note I15, at 84.
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reached an even greater audience. 145 Osama bin Laden commented,
"[Sleven out of every ten Americans suffer[ed] psychological problems
following the attacks on New York and Washington.'46 In one sense, the
media served to demarcate those directly affected by the attacks and the
public watching at home. Clearly, viewers in distant locations were not
physically impacted by the attacks. However, many viewers reported mental
injuries, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, many miles from New York
City and Washington, D.C. 147 Billions of viewers came into contact with a
mental stimulus in the form of these terrorist attacks and many developed
mental injuries as a result.14 With so many people experiencing those
events, the general public became
more aware of their effects on abilities
149
to work and function in society.
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have contributed greatly to enhancing
the public's understanding of and sympathy for mental-mental injuries.
The military's treatment of soldiers and sailors dealing with post-traumatic
stress disorder offers a microcosmic view of how states might reform their
workers' compensation laws to deal with mental-mental injuries. The
recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have received tremendous media
coverage allowing the public to witness the military's medical treatment of
combat veterans suffering from mental diseases like post-traumatic stress
disorder.' Since studies of post-traumatic stress disorder historically have
focused on combat veterans, the military has had a head start on dealing
with this issue. 5 '

145 Id.
146 Id. at 175.
147 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
148 Mental-physical injuries can also result from the same sort of stimuli. Mass psychogenic illness is a term used to describe the presence of physical injuries and illnesses that have
a psychological origin, such as might result from witnessing "vigorous emergency response
to suspected or actual ... terrorism (and consequent intense media attention) .... Direct
exposure to an agent is not required to develop somatic symptoms." PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR,
supra note 115, at 156-57.
149 For an examination of the functional outcomes of psychological trauma, see
PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR, supra note 115, at 400-13. "[Slurvival with impairment ... is the
condition to which much of the traumatic stress literature applies, such as when someone experiences chronic and disabling posttraumatic stress or depression symptoms." Id. at 402. See
also 9/11: MENTAL HEALTH IN THE WAKE OF TERRORIST ATrACKS, supra note 115, at 335 ("[F]ive
key outcomes of disaster on individuals and communities [are]: (i) 'psychological problems,'
such as post-traumatic stress disorder ... (2) 'non-specific distress;' (3)'health problems,'..
. (4)'chronic problems in living,' such as increased interpersonal, occupational, and financial
stressors; and (5)'psychosocial resource losses ....
')
150 See Frontline:The Soldier's Heart (PBS television broadcast Mar. 1, 2005), availableat
http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/pages/frontline/shows/heart/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2007); Felicia R.
Lee, Is Trauma Being Trivialized?, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 6, 2003, at B9; Goode and Eakin, supra
note 118, at A2.
151 See discussion supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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Research has demonstrated the clear relationship between mental
injuries and combat experiences in past wars.15 Exposure to combat
conditions results in "increased risk of posttraumatic stress disorder...
major depression, substance abuse, functional impairment in social and
'
employment settings, and the increased use of health care services."153
Nine hundred and forty-four soldiers were removed from Iraq between
the beginning of the war and December 2004 because of psychological
stress related to combat experiences."
Admittedly, many soldiers
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder are also physically injured
but others suffer mental injuries as a result of witnessing or participating
in horrifying events-the sights, sounds, and smells of combat. 5 The
effect of mental injuries resulting from combat experiences is seen in the
numbers of soldiers leaving military service after deployments to Iraq or
Afghanistan.'56 Roughly seventeen percent of soldiers reported symptoms
of mental injuries after returning from combat theaters.'57 The military
offers treatment for mental injuries such as post-traumatic stress disorder
as part of efforts to stem attrition and manage the huge psychological crisis
afflicting the country's military.'58
For some soldiers, treatment does not resolve their injuries and they
are unable to continue serving in the military. The military will discharge
soldiers with mental injuries impairing their ability to perform their duties.5 9
152 Charles W. Hoge, et. al., Mental Health Problems, Use of Mental Health Services, and
Attritionfrom MilitaryService After Returningfrom Deployment to IraqorAfghanistan,295 J.A.M.A.
1023, 1023 (2oo6).
153 Id.
154 Scott Shane, Military Plans a Delayed Test for MentalIssues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005.
155 Frontline:The Soldier's Heart,supra note 15o.

Through modern conditioning, we've trained them not just to shoot,
but to shoot accurately. But if we haven't prepared ourselves emotionally for the act ahead of time, and we just tricked you into killing, the
magnitude of the trauma can be significant, because we're having to live
with something that your body says is not right, that you didn't want to
do. And if you fail to be able to accept what you've done and rationalize
what you've done, then you spin down one of the paths to [post-traumatic stress disorder].
Id. (interview with LTC David Grossman, U.S. Army-Ret.).

156 Hoge, supra note 15z, at

1027.

157 Shane, supra note 153.

158 See id. "In an effort to better identify soldiers suffering serious psychological problems as a result of combat duty in Iraq, the Defense Department plans to perform an additional health assessment of servicemen and women three to six months after they come home
.Id.
.....
159 Io U.S.C. § 1201 (2ooo) (service members may be retired because physical disability
renders them unfit to perform their duties). The military has adapted this definition to fit
mental injuries. For example, the Army defines "physical disability" to include "disability
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The typical scenario for these soldiers features a stimulus while in combat
that causes a mental injury. This injury, very often post-traumatic stress
disorder, then leads to various treatment regimes within the military. If the
level of disability precludes the soldier from returning to duty, that soldier
will generally be medically discharged. 6° After a discharge is approved,
61
treatment through the Department of Veterans Affairs is available.
6
Compensation for the disability is provided through Veterans Affairs.
The monthly compensation amounts range from $115 to $2,935.163 Note
that Veterans Affairs does not base compensation for disability on the cause
of the injury, only on the level of impairment; compensation can be sought
for mental-mental injuries. 64 Higher compensation is allowed based on
the level of impairment and the soldier's family situation, whether the
soldier has a spouse, dependent children, or parents.1 61 The military's
guidelines for diagnosing post-traumatic stress disorder are found in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.' 66 In summary,
the military recognizes a soldier's disability from mental-mental injuries,
understands the limitations this places on the soldier's job-performance,
and compensates the soldier for that disability both monetarily and with
post-separation health care.
The military has created a regime designed to compensate workers
-soldiers, sailors, and airmen-for the mental-mental injuries they incur
while on the job. Of course, the military has had years to study these types
of injuries and slowly developed treatment and, later, compensation for
them.1 67 For whatever reason, state workers' compensation statutes have
due to mental disease." Army Regulation 635-40, PhysicalEvaluationforRetention, Retirement,
or Separation,at I16 availableat http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r635_4o.pdf.

16o

IO U.S.C. § 1201 (2ooo).

161 38 U.S.C. § 1710
162 38 U.S.C. § 110

(2000).
(2000).

io% impairment with no dependents
and ioo% impairment with a spouse, two parents, and a child. For current Department of
163 The amounts cited are based, respectively, on

Veterans' Affairs Compensation Rate Tables, see http://www.vba.va.govblnl2i/Rates/compol.
htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
164 Id. Butcf Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 342.0011(1); Ryan's Family Steakhouse v.Thomasson,

S.W.3d 889, 893 (Ky. 2002) (statutory changes designed to limit compensation for mental-mental injuries).
165 38 U.S.C. §§ I114- 11 5 (2000).
166 IRAQ WAR CLINICIAN GUIDE 23 (Paula P. Schnurr & Stephen J. Cozza, eds., zd ed.
82

2004) available at http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/ncdocs/manuals/ncmanual-iwcguide.
html (last visited Mar. 24, 2007). "According to the [DiagnosticandStatisticalManualof Mental
Disorders], posttraumatic stress disorder may occur following exposure to an extremely traumatic stressor when a person has directly witnessed situations that result in actual or threatened mortality or physical injury and the individual's response to this situation includes a
strong affective component of intense fear, helplessness, and/or horror." PSYCHOLOGY OF
TERROR, supra note 115, at 42.
167 See supra notes I16, 118, 120-21, 155 and accompanying text.
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been slow to match the progressive actions of the military. In Kentucky,
the reason was cost and the desire to attract businesses to the Bluegrass
State.' As discussed above, the Supreme Court of Kentucky ameliorated
the harsh statutory rules that denied mental-mental claims by interpreting
69
the statute to include physical exertion as a physically traumatic event.1
Kentucky's Supreme Court got it right as a policy matter but interpretive
problems still persist. For example, the vagueness of "physical exertion"
leaves open numerous possible mental-mental claims. If Kentucky
truly intends to attract businesses by creating more favorable workers'
compensation statutes, this ambiguity will need resolution. Perhaps
the General Assembly might look to the military's example and offer
compensation based on the degree of impairment and the worker's family
situation. Kentucky should match the military's focus on actual disability.
CONCLUSION

The White decision presented Kentucky employers, employees, and legal
practitioners with the prospect of workers' compensation for mental-mental
injuries. The decision clearly ignored the plain meaning of Kentucky's
workers' compensation act and allowed compensation for mental-mental
injuries. Kentucky has never allowed such compensation, claiming that
disallowing compensation served important interests. Yet the White decision
is unsurprising. 17 °
World events may have changed the mood in this country regarding the
compensability of mental-mental injuries. Awareness of post-traumatic
stress disorder has crept into the public consciousness in the aftermath of
September 11 th and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Ultimately, allowing compensation for mental-mental injuries in
Kentucky avoids the "Draconian result" that worried the Workers'
Compensation Board in White. 7 ' Degree of impairment and disability should
control because to do otherwise allows workers with minimal physicalmental injuries to benefit while those with possibly more debilitating
mental-mental injuries get nothing. In clearing up the inconsistencies
between White and the statute, Kentucky's General Assembly should adopt
the holding in White and look to other states and the military as models for
implementing it.

168 Patton Speech, supra note i i, at 3-4.
169 Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White, 202 S.W.3 d 24, 27 (Ky. 2oo6).
170 On remand, the A.L.J. held the physical exertion of CPR caused the claimant's mental injuries.
171 See Board Opinion, supranote 46, at 15.

